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Abstract
The recent online platforms propose multiple items for bidding.
The state of the art, however, is limited to the analysis of one item auc-
tion without resubmission. In this paper we study multi-item lowest
unique bid auctions (LUBA) with resubmission in discrete bid spaces
under budget constraints. We show that the game does not have pure
Bayes-Nash equilibria (except in very special cases). However, at least
one mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria exists for arbitrary number of bid-
ders and items. The equilibrium is explicitly computed for two-bidder
setup with resubmission possibilities. In the general setting we pro-
pose a distributed strategic learning algorithm to approximate equi-
libria. Computer simulations indicate that the error quickly decays in
few number of steps. When the number of bidders per item follows a
Poisson distribution, it is shown that the seller can get a non-negligible
revenue on several items, and hence making a partial revelation of the
true value of the items. Finally, the attitude of the bidders towards
the risk is considered. In contrast to risk-neutral agents who bids very
small values, the cumulative distribution and the bidding support of
risk-sensitive agents are more distributed.
Keywords: Auction, Bayes-Nash Equilibrium, Pareto optimal-
ity, Learning Mechanism.
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1 Introduction
Information technology has revolutionized the traditional structure of eco-
nomic and financial markets. The removal of geographical and time con-
straints has fostered the growth of online auction markets, which now include
millions of economic agents and companies worldwide and annual transac-
tion volumes in the billions of US dollars. Here, we study bidders’ learning
and behavior of a little studied type of online auctions called lowest unique
bid auction (LUBA). LUBAs are online auctions which have reached a con-
siderable success during last decade. Their key feature is that they are
reverse auctions: rather than the bidder with the highest bid (as in the
case of traditional auctions), the winner is the bidder who makes the low-
est unique bid. The recent online platforms propose even multiple items
and bidders can submit their bidders over several rounds [before a winner
is decided]. The bidding status that a bidder observes changes according to
the actions (bids) chosen by all the (active) bidders on the corresponding
item. Due to limited number of items and budget restrictions, bidders need
to manage their decision in a strategic way.
Literature review
One-item Auctions: The theory of auctions as games of incomplete in-
formation originated in 1961 in the work of Vickrey [2]. While auctions
with homogeneous valuation distributions (symmetric auctions) and self-
interested non-spiteful bidders is well-investigated in the literature, auction
with asymmetric bidders remain a challenging open problem (see [3, 4, 5] and
the references therein). With asymmetric auctions, the expected “revenue
equivalence theorem” [6] does not hold, i.e., there is a class of cumulative
valuation distribution function such that the revenue of the seller (auction-
eer) depends on the auction mechanism employed. In addition, there is no
ranking revenue between the auction mechanisms (first, second, English or
Deutch).
Multi-Item Auctions: There are few research articles on multi-item
auctions [7, 8, 9, 10]. Most of these works present computer simulation
and numerical experiments results. However, no analysis of the outcome of
the multi-item auction is available. There is no analysis of the equilibrium
seeking algorithm therein. The above mentioned works do not consider the
the resubmission feature. Note however that the possibility for a bidder to
resubmit another bid for the same item is already implemented in practice
in the online auction markets.
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Figure 1: Depending its remaining budgets, each bidder may act on multiple
items and may place multiple bids per item
LUBA: LUBA is very different than the second price auctions. The
particularity of LUBA is that it focuses on the lowest unique bid, which
creates lot of difficulties in terms of analysis. LUBA is different that the
lowest cost auction called procurement auction which is widely used in e-
commerce and cloud resource pooling [11] or in demand-supply matching in
power grids [12]. Single-item LUBAs are a special case of unmatched bid
auctions which have been studied by other researchers [13, 14, 15, 19, 16, 1].
The authors [14] run laboratory experiments with minbid auctions. They
consider the case where players are restricted to only one bid and compare
the results from their laboratory experiment with a Monte Carlo simulation.
The authors in [15] consider high and low unique bid auctions where bidders
are also restricted to a single bid. They provide a numerical approximation
of the solution for a game-theoretic model and compare it with the results of
a laboratory experiment. The work in [19] conducts a lowest unique positive
integer experiment and contrast the observed behavior with the solution of
a Poisson game with a single bid per player. [16, 17, 18] conducted field
experiments on Lowest-Unmatched Price Auctions with mostly large prizes
involving large numbers of participants (tens and hundreds of thousands).
[20] studies truthful multi-unit transportation procurement auctions. The
work in [21] discusses security and privacy issues of multi-item reverse Vick-
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rey auction by designing more secure protocols. Most of the above works
restrict the number of submissions per bidder to one. The recent focus
within the auction field has been multi-item auctions where bidders are not
restricted to buying only one item of the merchandise. The bidder can also
place multiple bids for each item. It has been of practical importance in
Internet auction sites and has been widely executed by them.
Contribution
Our contribution can be summarized as follows. Mimicking online platform
auctions, we propose and analyze a multi-item LUBA game with budget con-
straint, registration fee and resubmission cost. We show that the analysis
can be reduced into a constrained finite game (with incomplete informa-
tion) by eliminating the bids that are higher than the value of the item.
Using classical fixed-point theorems, there is at least one Bayes-Nash equi-
librium in mixed strategies. Next, we address the question of computation
and stability of such an equilibrium. We provide explicitly the equilibrium
structure in special cases. We provide a learning algorithm that is able to
locate equilibria. An imitative combined fully distributed payoff and strat-
egy learning (imitative CODIPAS learning) that is adapted to LUBA is
proposed to locate/approximate equilibria. We examine how the bidders
of the game are able to learn about the online system output using their
own-independent learning strategies and own-independent valuation. The
numerical investigation shows that the proposed algorithm can effectively
learn Nash equilibrium in few steps. It is shown that the auctioneers can
make a positive revenue when the number of bidders per bid exceeds a cer-
tain threshold. We then examine the attitude of the bidders towards the
risk. In contrast to risk-neutral agents who bids very small values, the cu-
mulative distribution and the bidding support of risk-sensitive agents are
more distributed.
Structure of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce LUBA mecha-
nism. In Sect 3 we set up the problem statement, whose solution approach is
given in Section 5.5. We provide an imitative learning algorithm for approx-
imating Nash equilibria in Section 4.2. Section 5 focuses on risk-sensitive
bidders’ behaviors. Section 6 concludes the paper.
We summarize some of the notations in Table 1.
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Table 1: Summary of Notations
Symbol Meaning
J set of potential bidders
n cardinality of J
B bid (action) space
I set of items (from auctioneers)
m cardinality of I
Bji bid set of bidder j on item i
r0(B1, . . . , Bn) payoff of the auctioneer
rj(B1, . . . , Bn| vj) payoff of bidder j
1l{.} indicator function.
F cumulative distribution of the valuation matrix
Fj (marginal) cumulative distribution of
the valuation vector of bidder j
2 Background on LUBA
A lowest unique bid auction operates under the following three main rules:
• Whoever bids the lowest unique positive amount wins.
• If there is no unique bid then no one wins. In particular, the bid of
the winner should be unmatched.
• No participant can see bids placed by other participants.
The term ”lowest unique bid” means is the lowest amount that nobody
else has bid and its computation is illustrated in Table 2 and Fig.2 below.
Bids may be any amount between 0.01 and 103 allowing people to buy
an item at an incredibly low price. The cost of the item is covered by the en-
try/administration/bid fee paid by all participants and by the resubmission
fee to make a bid.
In this example the Bid of 3 cents is the Lowest Unique Bid and is
awarded the auction result and would have to pay only 3 cents after the
registration fee. He/she has therefore purchased an item for 3 cents + the
Administration fee paid when he/she placed the bid and the registration fee.
If the Bidder of the successful bid had more than one bid they would need
to add a certain cost for each additional bid placed.
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Table 2: Unique lowest bid auctions
Bid Amount Number of Bids Status
1 cent 2 Not unique
2 cents 0
3 cents 1 Lowest Unique Bid!
4 cents 3 Not Unique
5 cents 2
6 cents 1 Unique but not the Lowest
7 cents 0
8 cents 1 Highest unique bid
9 cents 3 Not unique, highest bid
10 cents 0
Figure 2: Unique lowest bid auctions. Illustration of the rules of a LUBA
system. The winner results to be the bidder who has bid 3 cents, which is
the lowest unique bid. All the other bids are not unique expect from the one
of 6 cents and 8 cents, however, they are not the lowest one. By contrast,
in highest unique bid auctions the rules are reversed, and the winner is the
bidder making the unique highest bid (8 cents)
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Each bidder can decide to participate or not. A participant can start
bidding in just few steps:
• Register - complete the registration form. Your password will then be
emailed to the email address you provide us. It is vital you keep your
username and password confidential, otherwise you may allow others
to access your Bid Bank and place bids from your account.
The user is fully responsible for all activities that occur through your
subscription and under your password and account.
• Login - once the user receive its password via email, he/she login using
her email address as your username and your password. For security
issue the user can change her password.
• Purchase Credit - Buy Credits from your account. Smiles or other
related credits can be converted into a auction credit.
3 Problem Statement
Multi-item contest
A multi-item contest is a situation in which players exert effort for each item
in an attempt to win a prize. Decision to participate or not is costly and
left to the players. All the efforts are sunk while only the winner gets the
prize. An important ingredient in describing a multi-item contest with the
set of potential participants J = {1, ..., n}, the set of auctioneers proposing
the set of items I = {1, . . . ,m} is the contest success function, which takes
the efforts B of the agents and converts them into each agent’s probability
of winning per item:
Pj : B = (Bji)j,i ⊂ N
n×m 7→ [0, 1]m.
The (expected) payoff of a risk-neutral player j with vji a value of winning
item i and a cost of effort function cji is∑
i∈I
Pji(B)vji − cji(B).
Multi-item LUBA
One very popular multi-item contest used in online platform is multi-item
LUBA. In multi-item LUBA, Multiple sellers (auctioneers) have multiple
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items (objects) to sell on the online platform. These sellers have adopted a
lowest unique bid auction (LUBA) rule. The multi-item LUBA game (with
resubmission) is as follows.
There are n ≥ 2 bidders for m items proposed by the sellers. A bidder’s
assessment of the worth of the offered object for auction is called a value.
In an multi-item auction context a bidder has a vector of values, one value
per good.
Incomplete information about the others: A bidder may have its
own valuation vector but not the valuation vector of the others.
The bidders are assumed to have (possibly heterogeneous) valuation dis-
tributions. Each bidder independently submits a possibly several bid per
item without seeing the others’ bids. The submission fee per bid on item i
is ci. If there is only a unique lowest bid, the object is sold to the bidder
with unique lowest bid. Each bidder pays the cost cr for the registration
and administration fee. In addition, the winner pays her winning bid on
item i, that is, the price is the lowest unique bid on that item. Note that
the existence of a winning bid is not guaranteed, as for example, n identical
bids demonstrate. In the absence of a winner, the item remains with the
auctioneer. Note that, a tie-breaking rule can be used in that case. We
denote by vji the valuation of bidder j for item i. The random variable vji
has support [v, v¯] where 0 < v < v¯. Each bidder j has a initial total budget
of b¯j to be used for all items. Each bidder j knows its own-valuation vector
vj = (vji)i∈I and own-bid vector (bji)i∈I but not v−j = (vj′)j′ 6=j the valua-
tion of the other bidders. Note that each bidder can resubmit bids a certain
number of times subject to her available budget, each resubmission for item
i will cost ci. If bidder j has (re)submitted nji times on item i her total
submission/bidding cost would be njici in addition to the registration fee.
Denote the set that contains all the bids of bidder j on item i by Bji ⊂ N.
Thus, nji = |Bji| is the cardinality of the strictly positive bids by j on item
i. The set of bidders who are submitting b on item i is denoted by
Ni,b = {j ∈ J | b ∈ Bji}.
In order to get the set of all unique bids, we introduce the following: The
set of all positive natural numbers that were chosen by only one bidder on
item i is
B∗i = {b > 0 | |Ni,b| = 1}.
If B∗i = ∅ then there is no winner on item i at that round (after all the
resubmission possibilities). If B∗i 6= ∅ then there is a winner on item i and
the winning bid is inf B∗i and winner is j
∗ ∈ Ni,inf B∗i . The payoff of bidder
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j on item i at that round would be
rji = vji − |Bji|ci − inf B
∗
i − cr,
if j is a winner on item i, and
rji = −|Bji|ci − cr,
if j is not a winner on item i. The payoff of bidder j on item i is zero if Bji
is reduced to {0} (or equivalently the empty set).
rji(B) (1)
= [−cr − ci|Bji| − (vji − bji)1l{bji=inf B∗i }]1l{Bji 6={0}},
where the infininum of the empty set is zero.
rj(B) =
∑
i∈I
rji(B). (2)
The instant payoff of the auctioneer of item i is
ra,i =

∑
j
cr1l{Bji 6=∅} + inf B
∗
i +
∑
j=1
|Bji|ci

− va,i,
where va,i is the realized valuation of the auctioneer for item i. The instant
payoff of the auctioneer of a set of item I is ra,I =
∑
i∈I ra,i. Bidders are
interested in optimizing their payoffs and the auctioneers are interested in
their revenue.
3.1 Solution Concepts
Since the game is of incomplete information, the strategies must be specified
as a function of the information structure.
Definition 1. A pure strategy of a bidder is a choice of a subset of natural
numbers given the own-value and own-budget. Thus, given its own valuation
vector vj = (vji)i, bidder j will choose an action (Bji)i that satisfies the
budget constraints
∑
i
cr1l{Bji 6={0}} +
m∑
i=1
[inf B∗i ]1lBji∩[inf B∗i ] +
m∑
i=1
|Bji|ci ≤ b¯j.
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The set of multi-item bid space for bidder j is
Bj(vj , b¯j) = {(Bji)i | Bji ⊂ {0, 1, . . . , b¯j − cr},∑
i cr1l{Bji 6={0}} +
∑m
i=1[inf B
∗
i ]1lBji∩[inf B∗i ] +
∑m
i=1 |Bji|ci ≤ b¯j}.
A pure strategy is a mapping vj 7→ Bj ⊂ N. A constrained pure strategy
is a mapping vj 7→ Bj ∈ Bj. A mixed strategy is a probability measure over
the set of pure strategies.
The action set Bj(vj , b¯j) is finite because of budget limitation. A bid
bji ∈ Bji is hence less than min(b¯j , vji − cr).
3.2 Bidders’ equilibria
We define a solution concept of the above game with incomplete information:
Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2. A mixed Bayes-Nash strategy equilibrium is a profile (sj(vj))j
such that for all bidders j
Esj ,s−jrj(Bj(vj), B−j | vj) ≥ Es′j ,s−jrj(B
′
j, B−j | vj),
for any strategy s′j.
4 Analysis: Risk-Neutral Case
We are interested in the equilibria, equilibrium payoffs of the bidders and
revenue of the auctioneer. Note that the information structure is signif-
icantly reduced. Since j does not know the distribution of the random
matrix v−j = (vj′)j′ 6=j which may influence B−j, it is unclear how can bid-
der j evaluate the expected payoff Esj ,s−jrj(Bj(vj), B−j | vj). Therefore the
expected payoff needs to be learned by j.
Proposition 1. Let ci > 0. Any realized value of item i such that vji < c+cr
leads to a trivial choice (i.e., {0}) for bidder j. Any participative bidding
strategy Bji on item i such that |Bji| >
vji−cr
ci
is dominated by the strategy
{0}. Any strategy B such bji1lbji=inf B∗i + c+ cr > b¯j is dominated by {0} on
item i.
Proof of Proposition 1. By budget constraint, j′s bids must fulfill the budget
restriction ∑
i
cr1lBji 6={0} +
∑
i
|Bji|ci +
∑
i
bji1lbji=inf B∗i ≤ b¯j.
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If agent j bids on item i with bij > vji − cr − c then j gets in the bets case
vji− c˜− bji which is negative (loss) and j could guarantee zero as payoff by
not participating. Therefore the strategy 0 dominates any bji higher than
vji − c˜. Thus, the bid space of agent j on item i can be reduced to
Bji ⊂
m∏
i=1
{0, 1, 2, . . . ,min(vji − c˜, b¯j)}
such that ∑
i
cr1lBji 6={0} +
∑
i
|Bji|ci +
∑
i
bji1lbji=inf B∗i ≤ b¯j.
This completes the proof.
As a consequence of Proposition 1,
• the number of resubmissions on item i needs to be bounded by |Bji| ≤
vji−cr
ci
to be rewarding.
• when analyzing Bayes-Nash equilibria one can limit the action space
to all the subsets of the finite set
∏m
i=1{0, 1, 2, . . . ,min(vji − cr, b¯j)}
Proposition 2. Generically (under feasible budget), the LUBA game with
resubmission has no pure Bayes-Nash equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 2 . Let c > 0, n ≥ 2 and consider a pure behavioral
strategy profile B with a generic budget min(b¯j , vji) > 2 + c + cr. If Bij
does not contain a winning bid bij then Bji can be reduced by saving the
resubmission cost, i.e., an empty set or {0}. But if j is not participating on
item i (while its budget allows) then there is another player −j who could
also save by decreasing its bid set. However, the action a0 = ({0}, {1}, . . . , )
cannot be an equilibrium because player j can deviate and bids {1234 . . . , k}
with k higher than the maximum bid in action a0. Hence, there always a
player who can deviate and benefits if budget allows and if the value vji is
not reached in terms of bidding cost.
If Bij contains a winning bid bij, then there is another player j
′ 6= j such
that Bj′i does not contain the winning bid and one can apply the reasoning
above with Bj′i. Iterating this for all items, we deduce that the action B is
not a best response to itself. Hence, B cannot be a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
This completes the proof.
Note however that there are trivial cases with pure equilibria:
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• if multiple resubmissions are not allowed i.e., |Bji| ≤ 1 then the action
profile a1 = ({0}, . . . , {0}, {1}, {0}, . . . , {0}) is an equilibrium profile
of that item whenever the realized value is such that vji > 1 + ci +
cr. Putting together, the set of pure equilibria in this very special
case game G(J, (bj)j∈J , (ci)i∈I , cr,m, (Fj)j∈J) with |Bji| ≤ 1, Fj is the
cumulative distribution of vj , the set of action Aj = D0 ∪D1 ∪D2 ∪
. . . ∪ Dbj , where Dk = {d, d1 + . . . + dm = k, dl ∈ N} the set of
decomposition/partition of the number k, is given by

b11 b12 b13 . . . b1m
b21 b22 b23 . . . b2m
b31 b32 b33 . . . b3m
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
bn1 bn2 bn3 . . . bnm


where
(a) bji ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(i, j) ∈ I × J
(b)
∑n
j=1 bji = 1, ∀i ∈ I and
(c)
∑m
i=1 bji ≤ bj, , ∀j ∈ J
As shown in Figure 3, the learning algorithm always converges to one
of pure Nash equilibria except when they are symmetric, however, the
probability of symmetric situation is zero.
• If vji ∈ [1 + c+ cr, 2 + c+ cr) it is not interesting to bid higher than 1
because of negative payoff.
• when the realized value vji is below c+ cr, the action {0} is better for
j on i.
Non-potential game
As a corollary of Proposition 2 we deduce that LUBA is NOT a potential
game because one can exhibit the following cycle of action profiles for item
i
({1}, {0}, . . . , {0}) 7→ ({1}, {12}, . . . , {0})
7→ ({1}, {12}, {123}, {0} . . . , {0})
...
7→ ({1}, {12}, {123}, {1234} . . . , {1234 . . . b¯})
7→ ({0}, {12}, {123}, {1234} . . . , {123 . . . b¯})
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Figure 3: The vector field of the learning dynamics when n = 2, v = 4, c = 1.
Convergence to equilibrium.
7→ ({0}, {0}, {123}, {1234} . . . , {123 . . . b¯})
7→ ({0}, {0}, {0}, {1234} . . . , {123 . . . b¯})
...
. . . ({0}, {0}, {0}, {0} . . . , {0}, {123 . . . b¯})
7→ ({0}, {0}, {0}, {0} . . . , {0}, {1})
7→ ({12}, {0}, {0}, {0} . . . , {0}, {1})
7→ ({12}, {0}, {0}, {0} . . . , {0}, {0})
7→ ({1}, {0}, {0}, {0} . . . , {0}, {0}),
which is a finite (better-reply) improvement cycle.
The following result provides existence of equilibria in behavioral mixed
strategies.
Proposition 3. The multi-item Bayesian LUBA game (with resubmission)
but with arbitrary number of bidders has at least one Bayes-Nash equilibrium
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in mixed strategies under budget restrictions. Moreover, at a (generic) mixed
equilibrium, the expected payoff of the bidder is zero.
Proposition 3 provides existence of at least one Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
However, it does not tell us what are those equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 3. By Proposition 1 the constrained game has a finite
number of action. By standard fixed-point theorem, the multi-item Bayesian
LUBA game (with resubmission) but with arbitrary number of bidders has
at least one Bayes-Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies under budget re-
strictions.
Below we explicitly compute mixed equilibrium for two bidders with
resubmission.
Proposition 4. Let c + 1 < v and n = 2, c > 0. The game has a partially
mixed equilibrium which is explicitly given by
y∗ = (
c
v − 1
,
c
v − 2
, . . . ,
c
v − k
, 1−
k−1∑
l=0
c
v − (l + 1)
, 0, . . . , 0)
where k is the maximum number such that
∑min(b¯, v
c
)
l=0
c˜
v−l < 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let k be the largest integer such that yk = P({0, 1, ..., k}) >
0, k ≤ b¯. When bidder 2’s strategy is y, the expected payoff of bidder 1 when
bidding {0, 1, ..., l} is equal to zero in equilibrium due to the indifference con-
dition, for each l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. The cost of such a bid is equal to lc.
On the other hand, the expected gain can be computed as follows. With
probability y0, bidder 2 will not post any bid, the winning bid is 1, and the
gain is thus v − 1 for any l ≤ k. For 1 ≤ l ≤ k, the bidder 2 bids {0, 1, ..., l}
with probability yl and the winner bid is l + 1 from bidder 1, and 1’s gain
will v − (l + 1). The expected payoff of bidder 1 when playing {0, ..., l} is
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therefore given by
Action{0} :
r1i({0}, y) = 0
Action{01} :
r1i({01}, y) = (v − c− 1)y0 − cy1 − c(y2 + . . .+ yk),
Action{012} :
r1i({012}, y) = (v − 2c− 1)y0 + (v − 2c− 2)y1
−2cy2 − 2c(y3 + . . .+ yk),
. . .
Action{012 . . . l} :
r1i({012 . . . l}, y) = (v − lc− 1)y0
+(v − lc− 2)y1
+ . . .+ (v − lc− l)yl−1
−lcyl − lc(yl+1 + . . .+ yk)
Action{012 . . . (l + 1)} :
r1i({012 . . . l + 1}, y) = (v − (l + 1)c− 1)y0
+(v − (l + 1)c− 2)y1
+ . . .+ (v − (l + 1)c− (l + 1))yl
−(l + 1)cyl+1 − (l + 1)c(yl+2 + . . .+ yk)
. . .
Action{012 . . . k} :
r1i({012 . . . k}, y) = (v − kc− 1)y0 + (v − kc− 2)y1
+ . . .+ (v − kc− k)yk−1 − kcyk.
yl ≥ 0, y0 + . . .+ yk = 1
yk+s+1 = 0 for s ≥ 0.
It turns out that


(v − 1)y0 = c
(v − 1)y0 + (v − 2)y1 = 2c
. . .
(v − 1)y0 + (v − 2)y1 + . . .+ (v − l)yl−1 = lc
(v − 1)y0 + (v − 2)y1 + . . .+ (v − (l + 1))yl = (l + 1)c
. . .
(v − kc− 1)y0 + (v − kc− 2)y1 + . . .+ (v − kc− k)yk−1 = kc.
For l between 1 and k− 1 we make the difference between line l+1 and
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line l to get: 

y0 =
c
v−1
y1 =
c
v−2
. . .
yl−1 =
c
v−l
yl =
c
v−(l+1)
. . .
yk−1 =
c
v−k
yk = 1− (y0 + y1 + . . .+ yk−1) > 0
yk+1+s = 0.
Thus, the partially mixed strategy
y∗ = (
c
v − 1
,
c
v − 2
, . . . ,
c
v − k
, 1−
k−1∑
l=0
c
v − (l + 1)
, 0, . . . , 0)
is an equilibrium strategy. The equilibrium payoff is zero. This completes
the proof.
Note that the framework can easily capture situations in which the
number of potential participants can be unbounded. We introduce the
statistics of the bidding data as ni,b which is the number of bidders who
place b on item i. The random matrix (ni,b)i,b contains enough informa-
tion that will allow any player to compute its payoff. Therefore one can
work directly on bid statistics (ni,b)i,b. The knowledge of the total num-
ber of participants is not required. The payoff function of j on item i is
[−cr − ci|Bji| − (vji − bji)1l{bji=inf B∗i }]1l{Bji 6={0}}. The dependence on the
mean-field term (ni,b)i,b is expressed as following: bji ∈ B
∗
i if and only if bji
is the smallest non-zero bid such that ni,bji = 1.
4.1 Revenue of the auctioneers
We now investigate how much money the online platform can make by run-
ning multi-item LUBA. Since the platform will be running for a certain
time before the auction ends, each bidder is facing a a random number
of other bidders, who may bid in a stochastic strategic way. Their val-
uation is not known. We need to estimate the set of bids Bi and the
bid values on item i. We denote by nib the random number of bidders
who bid on b. If ni,b follows a Poisson distribution with parameter λi,b,
and that all variables ni,b are independent. The value λi,b is assumed to
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be non-decreasing with b. The expected payoff of the seller on item i is∑
j cr1lBji 6={0} +
∑
b Eni,bci + E inf B
∗
i − vi.
Proposition 5. Let λi,b =
vi
ci
1
(1+b)z , with z > 0. The expected revenue of the
seller on item i is
∑
j cr + E inf B
∗
i + vi[
∑
b
1
(1+b)z ], exceeds the value vi of
the item i for small value of z whenever
∑
b≤min(b¯,
vi
ci
)
1
(1 + b)z
> 1−
∑
j cr + E inf B
∗
i
vi
Proof of Proposition 5. The expected payoff of the seller on item i is equal
to
∑
j cr+
∑
b Eni,bci+E inf B
∗
i −vi. As we assume that ni,b follows a Poisson
distribution with parameter λi,b and that all ni,b are independent, we can
calculate that Eni,b = λi,b =
vi
ci
1
(1+b)z . Rewriting the expected payoff of the
auctioneer, we get that it is equal to
∑
j cr +
∑
b Eni,bci + E inf B
∗
i − vi.
Then, we can easily induce the condition for the expected revenue of the
seller exceeds the value of vi is
∑
b≤min(b¯,
vi
ci
)
1
(1 + b)z
> 1−
∑
j cr + E inf B
∗
i
vi
Note that in all-pay auction (with resubmission cost) if the probability
to win is Pj(B) =
1
n
(uniform lottery) then the revenue of the seller is∑
j cr1lBji 6={0}+
∑
b Eni,bci−vi. Thus, the difference between the two schemes
is the expected winning bid E inf B∗i if the action profile generates similar
distribution ni,b.
Proposition 3 provides existence of at least one Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
However, it does not tell us how to learn or to reach those equilibria. Below
we provide a learning procedure for equilibria.
4.2 Learning Algorithm
Imitative learning is very important in many applications [22] including
cloud networking, power grid, security & reliability, information dissemina-
tion and evolution of protocols and technologies. It has been successfully
used to capture animal behavior as well as human learning.
Based on randomly disturbed games a` la Harsanyi [23] who showed that
the equilibria of a game are limit points of sequences of ǫ−Nash as the
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parameter ǫ vanishes, the imitative learning follows the same line as a per-
turbed payoff-based scheme. So, when trying to learn the equilibria of a
game it makes sense to consider imitative Boltzmann-Gibbs strategy with a
small parameter ǫ. The number 1
ǫ
is sometimes interpreted as a rationality
level of the player. Small ǫ is therefore seen as big rationality level.
Surprisingly, it also makes sense to consider imitative Boltzmann-Gibbs
with big parameter ǫ because when the parameter ǫ approaches infinity, the
limiting of the imitative logit dynamics is the so-called “imitate the better”
dynamics [24]. The actions that are initially not present in the support
of the strategy will never be tried with imitative dynamics, so we always
consider initial points in the interior of the strategy space.
What is the information-theoretic function associated to the imitative
Boltzmann-Gibbs (iBG) strategy? The information-theoretic metric behind
the imitative Boltzmann-Gibbs learning is the relative entropy. This is
an important connection between imitative learning and information the-
ory since the relative entropy covers the mutual information, information
gain and the Shannon entropy as particular case. We introduce relative
entropy as a cost of moves in the LUBA games. One can interpret rel-
ative entropy as a cost of moves in the learning process. Specially, the
next Proposition 6 shows that the imitative Boltzmann-Gibbs strategy (or
imitative logit strategy, i-logit) is the maximizer of the perturbed payoff
rj(s
′
j, s−j) − ǫjdKL(s
′
j, sj) where dKL is the relative entropy from strategy
sj to s
′
j (also called Kullback-Leibler divergence) and
1
ǫj
is the rationality
level of player j, dKL(s
′
j , sj) = −
∑+∞
i=1 s
′
ji log2
(
s′ji
sji
)
.
The instant payoff of bidder j on item i at time/round t is a realized
value of
Rtji = rji(B
t) + ηtji
where ηtji is an observation/measurement noise. Bidder j wins on item i at
time t if its bid bji,t is the lowest unique bid on item i and Bji,t is feasible
in terms of the available budget of j at time t. Rji,t = 0 if bidder j does not
participate to item i. This algorithm describes how to update the reward
and the strategy in the bid space. Let Rˆji,t(Bj) be the estimation of reward
corresponding the j-th bidder to i-th item at round t if she decides the bid
set corresponding to the index of Bj, and Rˆj,t(Bj) =
∑
i Rˆji,t(Bj)
Let sj,t be a vector in the relative interior of the (|Bj | − 1)-dimensional
simplex of R|Bj |. This means that the cost to move for player j, from sj,t to
19
Algorithm 1 The proposed update reward learning algorithm
Initialization: Estimate reward on item i at round zero.
Rˆji,0(0), Rˆji,0(1), . . . , Rˆji,0(b¯(0)) ∼ uniform
For Round t+ 1
For every bidder and every item:
Rˆj,t+1(Bj) = Rˆj,t(Bj) + 1l{Bj,t=Bj}α
t
j(Rj,t − Rˆj,t(Bj))
Update S: sj,t+1(Bj) = sj,t(Bj)(1 + λj,t)
Rˆj,t(Bj)
Normalize S:
sj,t+1 is given by
c(sj,t+1, sj,t) = ǫj,t
∑
Bj∈supp(sj,t+1)
sj,t+1(Bj) ln
(
sj,t+1(Bj)
sj,t(Bj)
)
,
where ǫj,t > 0. This cost is added to the expected estimated payoff which is
〈sj,t+1, rˆj,t〉. Thus, we associate the following problem to player j :
max
sj,t+1
[〈sj,t+1, rˆj,t〉 − c(sj,t+1, sj,t)] .
Rˆj,t = max
Bj
rˆj,t(Bj) = max
sj,t+1∈P(Bj)
〈rˆj,t, sj,t+1〉 (3)
We introduce the Legendre-Fenchel transform of the relative entropy func-
tion
Wj,ǫj = max
sj,t+1∈P(Bj)
W˜j,ǫj(sj,t+1|sj,t, rˆj,t) (4)
where W˜j,ǫj(sj,t+1|sj,t, rˆj,t) :=
[
〈rˆj,t, sj,t+1〉 − ǫj,t
∑
Bj∈supp(sj,t+1) sj,t+1(Bj) ln(
sj,t+1(Bj)
sj,t(Bj )
)
]
,
ǫj,t is a positive parameter. Wj,ǫj corresponds to the best expected estimated
payoff with cost of learning.
Proposition 6. The following statements hold:
(i) The strategy sj,t+1(Bj) =
sj,t(Bj )e
rˆj,t(Bj)
ǫj,t
∑
B′
j
sj,t(B′j)e
rˆj,t(B
′
j
)
ǫj,t
is the optimal strategy
solution to (4).
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(ii) The Lagrange multiplier associated to (4) is given by
νj = ǫj,t

−1 + ln

∑
Bj
sj,t(Bj)e
rˆj,t(Bj )
ǫj,t



 ,
and the optimal value is
Wj,ǫj = ǫj,t ln

∑
Bj
sj,t(Bj)e
rˆj,t(Bj)
ǫj,t

 , ǫj,t > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let ǫj,t > 0. The function
sj,t+1 7−→ −ǫj,t
∑
Bj∈ support(sj)
sj,t+1(Bj) log2(sj,t+1(Bj))− constant
is strictly concave (the Hessian matrix with entries hii < 0 and hij = 0) and
the domain (simplex) is convex. Thus, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions are necessarily and sufficient for the problem in (4). Using KKT
conditions, one has
rˆj,t(Bj) + ǫj,t ln sj,t(Bj)− ǫj,t(1 + ln sj,t+1(Bj))− νj = 0,
where νj is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the simplex equality equa-
tion of player j. It follows that
rˆj,t(Bj)− νj
ǫj,t
− 1 = ln
(
sj,t+1(Bj)
sj,t(Bj)
)
Taking the exponential yields
sj,t+1(Bj) =
sj,t(Bj)e
rˆj,t(Bj )
ǫj,t
e
1+
νj
ǫj,t
Summing over the set of actions, one gets
∑
B′j
sj,t+1(B
′
j) = 1 which implies
that
e
1+
νj
ǫj,t =
∑
B′j
sj,t+1(B
′
j)e
rˆj,t(B
′
j )
ǫj,t
Thus, the optimal strategy is
sj,t+1(Bj) =
sj,t(Bj)e
rˆj,t(Bj )
ǫj
∑
B′j
sj,t(B′j)e
rˆj,t(B
′
j
)
ǫj
.
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The Lagrange multiplier is
νj = ǫj,t

−1 + ln

∑
Bj
sj,t(Bj)e
rˆj,t(Bj )
ǫj,t



 ,
and
Wj,ǫj = νj + ǫj,t = ǫj,t ln

∑
Bj
sj,t(Bj)e
rˆj,t(Bj )
ǫj,t


The next Proposition specifies the error bound in terms of the parameter
ǫj,t.
Proposition 7. There exists C|Bj | > 0 such that
|Wj,ǫj −max
Bj
rˆj,t(Bj)| = |Wj,ǫj − Rˆj,t| ≤ C|Bj |ǫj,t (5)
Moreover, C|Bj | ≤ ln (|Bj |) + maxBj | − ln(sj,t(Bj))|.
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof follows immediately from the definition
of Wj,ǫj and the fact that the entropy function of player j is between 0 and
ln |Bj |.
Proposition 8. The following results hold:
• High rationality regime:
lim
ǫ−→0
Wj,ǫ = max
Bj
rˆj(Bj)
• Low rationality regime:
lim
ǫ−→∞
Wj,ǫ = 〈sj,t, rˆj,t〉
Proof of Proposition 8. The first limit follows from Proposition 7. We now
prove the second limit. By changing the variable ǫ′ = 1
ǫ
one gets that ǫ′ goes
to zero and the limit becomes
lim
ǫ′−→0
ln
(∑
Bj
sj(Bj)e
ǫ′rˆj(Bj)
)
ǫ′
(6)
= lim
ǫ′−→0
(∑
Bj
sj(Bj)rˆj(Bj)e
ǫ′rˆj(Bj)
)
∑
Bj
sj(Bj)eǫ
′ rˆj(Bj)
=
∑
Bj
sj(Bj)rˆj(Bj) (7)
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by Hospital’s rule. This completes the proof.
It is important to notice that when ǫj goes to zero then the rational-
ity level 1
ǫj
tends infinity and player j gets closer to the maximum payoff
maxBj rˆj(Bj). This result also says that when ǫ goes to infinity, one gets the
expected payoff. Hence it gives a stationary point of the replicator equation.
We retrieve a well-known result in evolutionary process which states that
the evolution of phenotypes and genes has a tendency NOT to maximize the
fitness but the mixability of system which is somewhat captured with the
mixture term 〈sj,t, rˆj,t〉.
Relationship with replicator dynamics
Following [25] the scaled stochastic process from s follows a replicator dy-
namics given by
s˙j(Bj) = sj(Bj)[ERˆj(Bj)−
∑
B′j
sj(B
′
j)ERˆj(B
′
j)],
when the learning rate (λji, αji), which is random matrix, vanishes.
4.3 Second Learning Algorithm
The complexity of the bid space in the lowest unique bid system is O(2N ).
Take 5$ for an example, the bid space of LUBA with resubmission is 2500
when the unit is 1 cent. This limits considerably the usability of the pro-
posed algorithm. There is a need for reducing the curse of dimensionality or
complexity. We utilize Monte Carlo to approximate the Nash-Equilibrium.
The basic idea is that we utilize information provided by the system to guide
the behavior of bidders, and then the frequency of winner’s output is utilized
as the approximation of Nash-Equilibrium.
During the bidding process, after placing a bid, the following information
is provided by the system to the bidder.
1. Currently, whether the bid k wins or not.
2. If not, the reason is:
(a) k is non-unique.
(b) k is too high.
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Algorithm 2 The proposed Monte-Carlo algorithms
Initialization:
1. For bidder j, initial δ0k =
1
bj
2. Generate bid k from δt−1k
3. Based on the system output information, update δtk
(a) k is non-unique: δtk = 0. δ
t
l 6∈|K| = δ
t−1
l 6∈|K| +
δt−1
k
bj−|K|+1
(b) k is too-high: δtk = 0 δ
t
l 6∈|K|l≤k =δ
t
l 6∈|K|l≤k − 1 +
δt−1
k
k−|K|+1
For Round t+ 1
For every bidder and every item:
Rˆj,t+1(Bj) = Rˆj,t(Bj) + 1l{Bj,t=Bj}α
t
j(Rj,t − Rˆj,t(Bj))
Update S: sj,t+1(Bj) = sj,t(Bj)(1 + λj,t)
Rˆj,t(Bj)
Normalize S:
4.4 Pareto optimality and global optima for bidders
Pareto optimality (PO) for bidders’, is a configuration in which it is not
possible to make any one bidder better off without making at least one
bidder worse off.
Proposition 9. Let vji > c+ cr + 1.
S2 = {(Bji)j,i | ∀i, ni,1 = 1, ni,b = 0, ∀b ≥ 2
(Bji)i ∈ Bj}. (8)
Then, any profile in S2 is a Pareto optimal solution and the global payoff of
the bidders at these PO is
m∑
i=1
(−cr − c+ vji − 1)1lj|bji=1=inf B∗i .
The global optimum (GO) payoff of the bidders consists to select the
maximum value maxj vji for each item and place 1 cent for that bidder if its
budget allows to do so.
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The proof is immediate.
The inefficiency gap between total bidders’ payoff at mixed Bayes-Nash
equilibrium (which is 0) and GO payoff is
m∑
i=1
(−cr − c+max
j
vji − 1)1lbji=1=inf B∗i .
4.5 Numerical Investigation
In this subsection we introduce the experiment setting for the learning equi-
libria of LUBA game.
4.5.1 Illustration of Proposition 4: 2 bidders for 1 item
First we introduce the simulation of Proposition 4. Table 3 shows the ex-
periment setting. We observe from Figure 4 that the algorithm provides a
satisfactory result for approaching the mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium dis-
tribution.
Table 3: Two bidders - One item under budget restriction
n 2 m 1
b 6 v 8
α 0.5 λ 0.1
Assumption Symmetric Assumption Static Budget
4.5.2 Two players for one item (asymmetric situation)
Let n = 2,m = 1, b¯2 > b¯1, v2 > v1 The action profile of bidder 1 is
{{0}, {0, 1}, {0, 1, 2}} and that of bidder 2 is {{0}, {0, 1}, {0, 1, 2}, {0, 1, 2, 3}}.
Registration fee cr = 1 and submission cost c = 1 The parameters assump-
tion in this simulation conveys different bidders have different valuation tar-
get same item. Table 4 represents the payoffs matrix of bidder 1 and 2. The
row player is player 1 and the column player is player 2. The ceil list rewards
of each bidder and bidder 1 come first. Let the mixed strategy of bidder 1
be s1 = x = x0, x1, x2 and that of bidder 2 s2 = y = y0, y1, y2, y3 . Accord-
ing to the indifferent condition we can derive the mixed Nash equilibrium is
x = (1− c
v−2 −
c
v−3 ,
c
v−2 ,
c
v−3 ); y = (
c
v−1 ,
c
v−2 ,
c
v−3 , 1−
c
v−1 −
c
v−2 −
c
v−3 ). We
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Figure 4: Probability mass function of 2 bidders and 1 Item in the auction
system with resubmission. The blue asterisks signs present learned probabil-
ity mass functions of bidders by the proposed algorithm in final iteration, the
red circle signs present the theoretical Nash equilibrium provided by Propo-
sition 4, the green circle signs present the initial mixed strategy assigned to
bidders in the beginning of learning process.
now analyze the mixed strategy of bidder 1. According to the indifferent
condition, we can derive the following set of equations.
Action{0} :
r1({0}, x) = 0
Action{01} :
r1({01}, x) = (v − c− 1)x0 − c(x1 + x2),
Action{012} :
r1({012}, x) = (v − 2c− 1)x0 + (v − 2c− 2)x1 − 2cx2
Action{0123} :
r1({0123}, y) = (v − 3c− 1)x0 + (v − 3c− 2)x1
+(v − 3c− 3)x3
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Table 4: Two bidders - One item under budget restriction under asymmetric
situation
{0} {01} {012} {0123}
{0} 0, 0 0, v − c− 1 0, v − 2c− 1 0, v − 3c − 1
{01} v − c− 1, 0 −c,−c −c, v − 2c − 2 −c, v − 3c− 2
{012} v − 2c − 1, 0 v − 2c− 1,−c −2c,−2c −2c, v − 3c− 3
As the action {0123} provides an expected payoff which is strictly higher
than 0 obtained with the action {0}. The action {0} is not in the support of
the mixed Nash equilibrium. Assume the rewards of action {0, 1}, {0, 1, 2}
and {0, 1, 2, 3} are equal, then we can derive the Nash equilibrium of bidder
1 is x = (1− c
v−2 −
c
v−3 ,
c
v−2 ,
c
v−3 ); The Nash equilibrium of bidder 2 can be
derived utilizing the same method.
4.5.3 Three bidders - One item
Let n = 3,m = 1, b¯1 = 5, b¯2 = b¯3 = 3, c = cr = 1. Table 8 represents the
payoffs of bidder 1. The bid profile of bidders 2 and 3 are displayed in the
column. Bidder 1 choice is a row of the matrix.
Table 5: Three bidders - One item under budget restriction b¯1 = 5, b¯2 =
b¯3 = 3, registration fee cr = 1 and submission cost c = 1.
{0} {0} {1} {0} {0} {1} {1} {1}
{0} 0 0 0 0
{1} (v − 3)∗ −2 −2 −2
{2} v − 4 −2 −2 v − 4
{ 3} v − 5 −2 −2 v − 5
{12} v − 4 v − 5 v − 5 v − 5
{13} v − 4 −3 −3 −3
{23} v − 5 −3 −3 v − 5
{123} v − 5 −4 −4 −4
If v−c−cr−1 = v−3 < 0 then player 1 will not participate because the
value of the item is below the cost to get it. Due to the unfeasible budget
from bidders 2 and 3 who cannot bid 2 cents, the pure action ({1}, {0}, {0})
is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if v− c− cr− 1 = v− 3 ≥ 0. If v− 2c− cr− 2 =
v−5 > 0 then bidder 1 can guarantee a positive payoff by playing the action
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{12}. Therefore, player 1 will participate for sure because her action {12}
dominates {0} in that case.
From Figure 5, which is the corresponding simulation results, we can
conclude that the learning algorithms converged to the Nash equilibrium
described in Table 8.
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Figure 5: Probability mass function of 3 players and 1 Items in the auction
system with resubmission and budget constraint. The blue asterisks present
Bidder 1’s strategy. The black circles present Bidder 2’s strategy and the
read plus sign present Bidder 3’s strategy.
4.5.4 Four bidders - Two items
4.5.5 Impact of Parameters
We investigate the impact of parameters in the proposed learning algorithm
described.Table 7 shows experiment setting details. In order to analyze the
numerical convergence of the learning scheme we introduce root mean square
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Table 6: Summary of Multi-Items Experiment Setting
Symbol Setting
n 4
m 2
α 0.001
λ 0.01
c 1
Resource for item 1 and 2 [2000 1500]
Initial of Budget [100 120 80 90]
Initial of Rˆ0ji 0.0001
v for j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} [40,102],[42,109],[38,100],[36,110]
error RMSE between two sequential round strategies.
RMSEt,t−1 =
√∑
j∈J
∑
Bj
∑
i
(sji,t(Bj)− sji,t−1(Bj))2
Figure 7 and 8 present the statistic properties of RMSE evolution with
the bid round obtained by the proposed learning algorithm. Compared
to α = 0.1 and λ = 0.1, the results shows a quickly converged property.
The plot shows that the large parameter setting results less outliers in the
experiment results. According to the results in Figure 7 and 8, the parameter
α and λ influence the convergence of the proposed algorithm equally and a
large α can reduce disturbance and outliers more effectively.
Table 7: Parameters Impact Investigation
Symbol Original Setting Compared Setting
α 0.1 1
λ 0.1 1
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Figure 6: Probability mass function of 4 players and 2 Items in the auction
system with budget update. The red circles present learned probability
mass functions of each bidder target each item by the proposed algorithm
in first iteration, the green plus sign present corresponding results in 1000th
iteration, the black asterisks present results in 1800th iteration and the blue
crosses present results in 2000th iteration.
5 Risk-Sensitive Problem Statement
Multi-Item contest
A multi-item contest is a situation in which players exert effort for each item
in an attempt to win a prize. Decision to participate or not is costly and left
to the players. An important ingredient in describing a multi-item contest
with the set of potential participants J = {1, . . . , n}, the set of auctioneers
proposing the set of items I = {1, . . . ,m} is the contest success function,
which takes the efforts b of the agents and converts them into each agent’s
probability of winning per item: pj : b = (bji)j,i ∈ R
n×m 7→ [0, 1]m. The
(expected) payoff of a risk-neutral player j with vji the realized value of
winning item i and a cost of effort function cji is
∑
i∈I pji(b)vji− cji(b). The
risk sensitive payoff is u−1[E(u(vji− cji))], where u is a one-to-one mapping.
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Figure 7: Statistic information on RSME on strategies probability distri-
bution according to the experiment setting in the Table7 . In the Figure
(a) and (c), the red curve with solid squares is the RMSE of 110th re-
peat experiment, the solid black curve is the median, the gray-shade area
corresponding to the region between the percentiles P25 and P75, and the
external bounding curves are the percentiles P5 and P95.(b) and (d) Box
plot of RMSE on strategies probability distribution. On each box, the red
central mark is the median, the edges of each box are the 25th and 75th
percentage, the whiskers extend to the most extreme datapoints which are
not considered to be outliers, and the outliers are plotted individually in the
figure.
Multi-Item LUBA: Risk-Sensitive Case
Multiple sellers (auctioneers) have multiple items (objects) to sell on the
online platform. The payoff of bidder j on item i at that round would be
rji = vji − ci − inf B
∗
i − cr, if j is a winner on item i, and rji = −ci − cr, if
j is not a winner on item i and bji > 0. The instant payoff of bidder j on
item i is zero if bji is reduced to 0 (or equivalently the empty set).
rji(b) (9)
= [−cr − ci + (vji − bji)1l{bji=inf B∗i }]1l{bji 6=0},
where the infininum of the empty set is zero.
rj(b) =
∑
i∈I
rji(b). (10)
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Figure 8: Statistic information on RSME on strategies probability distri-
bution according to the experiment setting in the Table7 . In the Figure
(a) and (c), the red curve with solid squares is the RMSE of 110th re-
peat experiment, the solid black curve is the median, the gray-shade area
corresponding to the region between the percentiles P25 and P75, and the
external bounding curves are the percentiles P5 and P95.(b) and (d) Box
plot of RMSE on strategies probability distribution. On each box, the red
central mark is the median, the edges of each box are the 25th and 75th
percentage, the whiskers extend to the most extreme datapoints which are
not considered to be outliers, and the outliers are plotted individually in the
figure.
The risk-sensitive instant payoff of bidder j is u−1j [Euj(rj)] . Each bidder
j has a budget constraint
cr +
∑
i∈I
ci1l{bji 6=0} + bji1l{bji=inf B∗i } ≤ b¯j .
The instant payoff of the auctioneer of item i is
ra,i =

∑
j
(cr + ci)1l{bji 6=0} + inf B
∗
i

− va,i,
where va,i is the realized valuation of the auctioneer for item i. The instant
payoff of the auctioneer of a set of item I is ra,I =
∑
i∈I ra,i. The risk-
sensitive instant payoff of the auctioneer of a set of item I is u−1a [Eua(ra,I)] .
Bidders are interested in optimizing their risk-aware payoffs and the
auctioneers are interested in their revenue under risk.
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5.1 Risk-Sensitive Solution Concepts
Since the risk-sensitive game is of incomplete information, the strategies
must be specified as a function of the information structure.
Definition 3. A pure strategy of bidder j is a choice of a subset of natural
numbers given the own-value and own-budget. Thus, given its own valuation
vector vj = (vji)i, bidder j will choose an action (bji)i that satisfies the
budget constraints
cr1l{bj 6=0} +
m∑
i=1
[inf B∗i ]1lbji=inf B∗i +
m∑
i=1
ci1l{bji 6=0} ≤ b¯j.
The set of multi-item bid space for bidder j is
Bj(vj , b¯j) = {(bji)i | bji ∈ [0, b¯j ],
cr1l{bj 6=0} +
∑m
i=1[inf B
∗
i ]1lbji=inf B∗i +
∑m
i=1 ci1l{bji 6=0} ≤ b¯j}.
A pure strategy is a mapping vj 7→ bj ∈ R+. A constrained pure strategy
is a mapping vj 7→ bj ∈ Bj. A mixed strategy is a probability measure over
the set of pure strategies.
5.2 Continuum approximation of discrete bid space
Let δ > 0 be a currency/coin point in which the bidding will take place. δ
is a rational number. The bid space is δN = {δ, 2δ, 3δ, . . .} ⊂ R. When the
bid units are very small (below or in the order of δ = 1100 ) the bid space is
huge and the complexity is exponential. One standard method is to consider
this set as discretization of the continuous set
∏
i∈I(0,min(b¯j , vji − ci − cr)]
under the budget constraint
cr +
∑
i∈I
ci1l{bji 6=0} + bji1l{bji=inf B∗i } ≤ b¯j .
However, the continuous bid space case provides different outcomes as
explained below.
We investigate the smooth function case. For each item i, the random
variable vji has a continuously differentiable (C
1) cumulative distribution
function Fji. Note that the event {w : bji(vj , w) = bki(vk, w)} for j 6= k
is of measure zero since the valuation has a continuous probability density
function. Thus, the risk-sensitive LUBA analysis reduces to the (non-zero)
lowest price on each item and their attitudes towards the risk.
33
Lemma 1. In the continuous bid space case, the terms P (xi < minj′ 6= bj′i)
and u(vji − xi)P (xi < minj′ 6= bj′i) are decreasing in xi.
Proof. It is because the cumulative distribution function F (x) = P (X < x)
increases with x and the function x 7→ c−x deceases with x. Observing that
P (xi < minj′ 6= bj′i) can be written as 1− F (xi), the assertion follows.
Lemma 1 provides a structural property of the better response bid in
the continuous bid space case. The monotonicity properties above say that
one can improve the payoff by approaching the bid to zero. However, zero
is not allowed bid. When j do not participate to the LUBA its payoff
is u−1j [Euj(0, b−j)] = 0. The risk-sensitive participation constraint yields
u−1j [Euj(b)] ≥ 0.
5.3 Bid Resubmissions
Let T be the time space of one round of LUBA game, T = {1, . . . , T} for
T ≥ 1. At each time-step t ∈ T the bidders have opportunity to revise and
resubmit another bid. A bidder has also the option not to resubmit and
save the resubmission cost. A sequence of actions on item i by bidder j is
aji = (b
1
ji, . . . , b
T
ji), where b
t
ji can be a bid in δN or NoBid = ”0”.
Note that each bidder can resubmit bids a certain number of times sub-
ject to her available budget, each resubmission for item i will cost ci. Let
Bji be the set of the non-zero (strictly positive) component of the action aji.
The cardinality of Bji is nji =
∑
t∈T 1l{btji>0}. If bidder j has (re)submitted
nji times on item i her total submission/bidding cost would be njici in ad-
dition to the registration fee. Denote the set that contains all the bids of
bidder j on item i by Bji ⊂ δN. The set of bidders who are submitting b on
item i is denoted by
Ni,b = {j ∈ J | b ∈ Bji}.
The set of all positive natural numbers that were chosen by only one bidder
on item i is B∗i = {b > 0 | |Ni,b| = 1}. If B
∗
i = ∅ then there is no winner
on item i at that round (after all the resubmission possibilities). If B∗i 6= ∅
then there is a winner on item i and the winning bid is inf B∗i and winner is
j∗ ∈ Ni,inf B∗i . The payoff of bidder j on item i at that round would be rji =
vji− |Bji|ci − inf B
∗
i − cr, if j is a winner on item i, and rji = −|Bji|ci − cr,
if j is not a winner on item i. The payoff of bidder j on item i is zero if Bji
is reduced to {0} (or equivalently the empty set).
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rji(B) (11)
= [−cr − ci|Bji|+ (vji − bji)1l{bji=inf B∗i }]1l{Bji 6={0}},
where the infininum of the empty set is zero. The payoff is rj(B) =
∑
i∈I rji(B)
and the risk-sensitive payoff is u−1j [Euj(rj(B))] . We choose the exponential
function (with risk-sensitive index θj )to simplify the analysis.
5.4 Risk-sensitive equilibria
Proposition 10 (Two bidders). Let v > c + 1. The risk-sensitive LUBA
with resubmission has a mixed strategy given by
(x0, x1, x12, . . . , x12...,(k−1), x12...k)
with x12...i =
e(i+1)θc−eiθc
eθ(v−(i+1))−1
,
x12...k = 1− x0 −
∑k−1
i=1 x12...i and x12...l = 0 if l > k
where uj(rj) = e
θjrj .
Proof. Let k be the largest integer such that yk = P({0, 1, ..., k}) > 0, k ≤ b¯.
When bidder 2’s strategy is y, the expected payoff of sensitive bidder 1
when bidding {0, 1, ..., l} is equal to 1 in equilibrium due to the indifference
condition, for each l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. The cost of such a bid is equal to lc.
On the other hand, the expected gain can be computed as follows. With
probability y0, bidder 2 will not post any bid, the winning bid is 1, and the
gain is thus v − 1 for any l ≤ k. For 1 ≤ l ≤ k, the bidder 2 bids {0, 1, ..., l}
with probability yi and the winner bid is i + 1 from bidder 1, and 1’s gain
will v − (l + 1). Take the risk-sensitive perspective into consideration, The
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[Euj(rj(B))] of bidder 1 when playing {0, ..., l} is therefore given by
Action{0} :
u(r1i({0}, y)) = e
θ∗0 = 1
Action{01} :
u(r1i({01}, y)) = e
θ(v−c−1)y0 + e
−θcy1 + e
−θc(y2 + . . . + yk),
Action{012} :
u(r1i({012}, y)) = e
θ(v−2c−1)y0 + e
θ(v−2c−2)y1
+e−θ2cy2 + e
−θ2c(y3 + . . .+ yk),
. . .
Action{012 . . . l} :
u(r1i({012 . . . l}, y)) = e
θ(v−lc−1)y0
+eθ(v−lc−2)y1
+ . . .+ eθ(v−lc−l)yl−1
+e−θlcyl + e
−θlc(yl+1 + . . .+ yk)
Action{012 . . . (l + 1)} :
u(r1i({012 . . . l + 1}, y)) = e
θ(v−(l+1)c−1)y0
+eθ(v−(l+1)c−2)y1
+ . . .+ eθ(v−(l+1)c−(l+1))yl
+e−θ(l+1)cyl+1 + e
−θ(l+1)c(yl+2 + . . . + yk)
. . .
Action{012 . . . k} :
u(r1i({012 . . . k}, y)) = e
θ(v−kc−1)y0 + e
θ(v−kc−2)y1
+ . . .+ eθ(v−kc−k+1)yk−1 + e
−θkcyk.
yl ≥ 0, y0 + . . .+ yk = 1,
yk+s+1 = 0 for s ≥ 0.
It turns out that

(eθ(v−1) − 1)y0 + 1 = e
θc
(eθ(v−1) − 1)y0 + (e
θ(v−2) − 1)y1 + 1 = e
θ2c
. . .
(eθ(v−1) − 1)y0 + (e
θ(v−2) − 1)y1 + . . .
+(eθ(v−l) − 1)yl−1 + 1 = e
θlc
(eθ(v−1) − 1)y0 + (e
θ(v−2) − 1)y1 + . . .
+(eθ(v−(l+1)) − 1)yl + 1 = e
θ(l+1)c
. . .
(eθ(v−1) − 1)y0 + (e
θ(v−2) − 1)y1 + . . .
+(eθ(v−k) − 1)yk−1 + 1 = e
θkc.
For l between 1 and k− 1 we make the difference between line l+1 and
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line l to get: 

y0 =
eθc−1
eθ(v−1)−1
y1 =
e2θc−eθc
eθ(v−2)−1
. . .
yl−1 =
elθc−e(l−1)θc
eθ(v−l)−1
yl =
e(l+1)θc−elθc
eθ(v−(l+1))−1
. . .
yk−1 =
e(k)θc−e(k−1)θc
eθ(v−k)−1
yk = 1− (y0 + y1 + . . .+ yk−1) > 0
yk+1+s = 0.
Thus, the partially mixed strategy
y∗ = (
eθc − 1
eθ(v−1) − 1
,
e2θc − eθc
eθ(v−2) − 1
, . . . ,
e(k)θc − e(k−1)θc
eθ(v−k) − 1
,
1−
k−1∑
l=0
e(l+1)θc − elθc
eθ(v−l−1) − 1
, 0, . . . , 0)
is an equilibrium strategy. The equilibrium sensitive-risk payoff is 1
θj
log(Eeθjrj) =
0.
Note that, for two bidders the equilibrium strategy has monotone sup-
port. The set of actions Bj such that xBj > 0 is an increasing inclusion:
{} ⊂ {1} ⊂ {12} ⊂ {123} ⊂ {1234} . . . {1234 . . . k},
it means that x2 = x3 = . . . = xk = 0 = x13 = x14 = x23 = x24 etc.
We analyze the Nash-Equilibrium of LUBA with resubmission in which
the risk-sensitive payoffs are considered. Without losing generalization mean-
ing, we specify uj(rj) = e
θjrj . So the risk-sensitive instant payoffs of bidder
j is Rj =
1
θj
log(Eeθjrj) where θj 6= 0. For θj = 0, the Rj is equal to rj . The
bidder j can be divided into different categories based on θj.
1. The bidder j is risk-seeking for θ > 0
2. The bidder j is risk neutrality for θ = 0
3. The bidder j is risk aversion for θ < 0
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We analyze the simple case under the above assumption, where 2 bidders
participate in the LUBA. We analyze different combinations of θj and give
corresponding payoff matrix. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume
that the bid space of each bidders is {0, 1}. Despite the simplification, this
methodology can be extended to the general situation.
Table 8: uj(rj) = e
θjrj of two risk sensitive bidders - One item
0 1
0 (1, 1) (1, eθ2(v−1))
1 (eθ1(v−1), 1) (e−θ1 , e−θ2)
1. Pure Nash-Equilibrium: Table 9 shows how the payoff matrix for
risk-sensitive can be converted to the risk-neural payoff matrix when
analyzing pure Nash Equilibrium. So there are two pure Nash equi-
librium.
Table 9: Two risk neutral bidders - One item
0 1
0 (0, 0) (0, v − 1)∗
1 (v − 1, 0)∗ (-1,-1)
2. Mixed Nash-Equilibrium: For bidder 2 the mixed strategy is:
(a) Bidder 1: ( 1−e
θ2
1−evθ2
, 1− 1−e
θ2
1−evθ2
)
(b) Bidder 2: ( 1−e
θ1
1−evθ1
, 1− 1−e
θ1
1−evθ1
)
As shown in Figure 9, the probability of participating in a risk-seeking
bidder is greater than that of a risk-neutral one. And the probability of
participating in a risk-aversion bidder is less than that of a risk-neutral one.
This observation shows that over assumption on risk function is reasonable.
The next Theorem shows that this monotonicity property of the mixed
equilibrium is lost when three or more bidders are involved.
Proposition 11 (Three or more bidders). Suppose the realized parameters
(v, θ) of the risk-sensitive LUBA are symmetric with three or more bidders.
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Figure 9: Probability of not participating in LUBA in mixed strategy for
risk-sensitive bidders. The black dash line represents the strategy evolution
with value for a risk-seeking bidder whose risk parameter is θ = 0.2. The
red dot line represents the strategy evolution with value for a risk-neutral
bidder whose risk parameter is θ = 0. The blue line is strategy evolution
with value for a risk-aversion whose risk parameter is θ = −0.2.
Then the risk-sensitive LUBA with resubmission has a symmetric equilib-
rium in mixed strategies. However, there is no symmetric mixed equilibrium
with monotone strategies.
The existence of symmetric mixed equilibrium in finite symmetric game
is by now standard. We omit the details proofs of the non-monotonicity
of the optimal strategies when three or more bidders are involved. The
example below illustrates the result in the three-bidder case.
We analyze another simple example to show the properties of LUBA
with resubmission. We assume 3 bidders participate in a symmetric LUBA
game. The submission fee is c, and the bid space is The specific parameters
setting is {1, 2, 3} and their combinations. The payoff matrix is shown in
the Table 10.
Based on the payoff matrix, we introduce the following indifferent con-
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Table 10: Payoff matrix in 3 bidders symmetric LUBA game
0,0 1,0 2,0 1.2,0 0,1 1,1 2,1 1.2,1 0,2 1,2 2,2 1.2 ,2 0,1.2 1,1.2 2,1.2 1.2,1.2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 v-c-1 -c v-c-1 -c -c -c -c -c v-c-1 -c v-c-1 -c -c -c -c -c
2 v-c-2 -c -c -c -c v-c-2 -c -c -c -c -c -c -c -c -c -c
1,2 v-2c-1 v-2c-2 v-2c-1 -2c v-2c-2 v-2c-2 -2c -2c v-2c-1 -2c v-2c-1 -2c -2c -2c -2c -2c
dition:
1. Payoff(0) = 0
2. Payoff(1) = (v− c−1)(y0z0+ y2z0+ y0z2+ y2z2)− c[1− (y0z0+ y2z0+
y0z2 + y2z2)]
3. Payoff(2) = (v − c− 2)(y0z0 + y1z1)− c[1− (y0z0 + y1z1)]
4. Payoff(3) = (v − 2c− 1)Q0 + (v − 2c− 2)Q1 − 2c[1 −Q0 −Q1]
where Q0 = y0z0 + y2z0 + y0z2 + y2z2, and Q1 = y1z0 + y1z1 + y0z1. As
we assume that the proposed system is a symmetric LUBA game with three
bidders, thus we can induce the following equations according the above
indifferent condition equations.
1. (v − c− 1)(x20 + 2x0x2 + x
2
2)− c[1− (x
2
0 + 2x0x2 + x
2
2)] = 0
2. (v − c− 2)(x20 + x
2
1)− c[1 − (x
2
0 + x
2
1)] = 0
3. (v− 2c− 1)(x20+2x0x2+x
2
2)+ (v− 2c− 2)(2x0x1+ x
2
1)− 2c[1− (x
2
0+
2x0x2 + x
2
2)− (2x0x1 + x
2
1)]
Then we can induce the following equations: (x0+x2)
2 = c
v−1 , x
2
0+x
2
1 =
c
v−2 ,
and 2x0x1+x
2
1 =
c
v−2 Combining the truth that x0+x1+x2+x1,2 = 1 we can
derive the Nash-Equilibrium of this simple example is {x0 = 2
√
c
5(v−2) , x1 =√
c
5(v−2) , x2 =
√
c
v−1 −2
√
c
5(v−2) , andx{1,2} = 1−x0−x1−x2}We calculate
four Nash-Equilibrium of different value, and the result is shown in Figure
10.
We can observe that the probability of placing the combination bid 1, 2
is increasing with the value variable. Intuitively, it makes sense that when
the valuation of the product is very high, the bidder is willing to take a risk
for multi-bids. And when the value goes very high, the bid choice of {1, 2}
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Figure 10: The Nash-Equilibrium evolves with the value v
dominates the whole bid choice space, as shown in the Figure 10: ’the value
in the game: v = 97’.
In a more general case, we show the evolution of Nash-Equilibrium with
the value of the bidders targeting the item in Figure 11. By observing
results, we can conclude that:
1. The probability of {0} is higher than {1} and {2} in a Nash-Equilibrium.
2. The probabilities of single bid actions in the bid space decrease with
the value in a Nash-Equilibrium
3. The probability of {1, 2} in a Nash-Equilibrium increases with the
value.
4. The option of {1, 2} is dominant in action space when the valuation
of bidders is very high.
5.5 Simulations of the Risk-Sensitive Scenarios
This section we will show and analyze the results from out proposed learn-
ing algorithm. In order to show the effectiveness of our Monte Carlo algo-
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Figure 11: The Nash-Equilibrium evolves with the value v
rithm, we conduct a comparison experiment. In the comparison experiment,
we compare the results of our proposed learning algorithm and our Monte
Carlo algorithm under the same experiment parameters setting. The specific
setting is shown in table 11.
Table 11: Parameters setting in the comparison experiment
n 10 m 1
b¯ 10 c 1
α 0.05 λ 0.05
We analyze the frequencies of each single bid from zero to nine, and
the results is shown in Figure 12. As shown in Figure 12, the equilibria,
learned by both of proposed algorithms, show the same tendency. Obvi-
ously, they are not exactly same. The reason of this phenomenon is that the
Monto-Carlo algorithm is an approximate method and doesn’t take consid-
eration of value variable. However, the difference between the approximate
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result(obtained by Monte-Carlo algorithm) and the precise results(obtained
by proposed learning algorithm) is very small. This phenomenon shows that
our Monto-Carlo can effectively calculate the approximate Nash-Equilibrium
in LUBA.
Figure 12: Strategy distribution on four different bidders of Item 1 after
5000 time iterations.
Note that we show the effectiveness of our Monte-Carlo algorithm in
small bid space, now we show the application of our Monte-Carlo algorithm
in large bid space situation. We assume that 100 bidders participate the
game, their budgets are sampled from 300 to 350 in a uniform distribution,
and the value variable is from 90 to 100. The result is shown in Figure 13.
From the results we can draw the following conclusions. The tendency of
approximated Nash Equilibrium is same as the small bid space situations.
Practically, the strategy form like the tendency shown in Figure 13 is a
suboptimal solution of approximating Nash Equilibrium. It makes sense for
that if a bidder want to win the LUBA game, he or she has to block the
small bid. And, in a multi bidders LUBA with resubmission, any relative
big bids have a chance to win the product as the probability of placing a
non-unique bid is high in this experiment setting.
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Figure 13: Strategy distribution on four different bidders of Item 1 after
5000 time iterations.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have investigated multi-item lowest unique bid auctions in
discrete bid spaces under heterogeneous budget constraints and incomplete
information. Except for very special cases, the game does not have equilibria
in pure strategies. As a constrained finite game, there is at least one mixed
Bayes-Nash equilibrium. A mixed equilibrium is explicitly computed in two
bidder setup with resubmission possibilities. We have proposed a distributed
strategic learning algorithm to approximate equilibria in the general setting.
The numerical investigation has shown that the proposed algorithm can
effectively learn Nash equilibrium in few number of steps. It is shown that
the auctioneers can make a positive revenue when the number of bidders per
bid exceeds a certain threshold.
44
References
[1] Marco Scarsini, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille: Lowest Unique Bid Auc-
tions, Preprint 2010.
[2] Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed ten-
ders. J. Finance 16, 837.1961.
[3] Maskin E. S., Riley J. G. Asymmetric auctions. Rev. Econom. Stud. 67,
413-438, 2000.
[4] Lebrun B: First-price auctions in the asymmetric n bidder case. Inter-
national Economic Review 40:125-142, (1999)
[5] Lebrun B.: Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions. Games
and Economic Behavior 55:131-151, 2006.
[6] Myerson R., Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Re-
search, 6 (1981),pp. 58-73.
[7] Bang-Qing Li, Jian-Chao Zeng, Meng Wang and Gui-Mei Xia, A negoti-
ation model through multi-item auction in multi-agent system, Machine
Learning and Cybernetics, 2003 International Conference on, 2003, pp.
1866-1870 Vol.3.
[8] C. Yi and J. Cai, Multi-Item Spectrum Auction for Recall-Based Cog-
nitive Radio Networks With Multiple Heterogeneous Secondary Users,
IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 781-792,
Feb. 2015.
[9] N. Wang and D. Wang, Model and algorithm of winner determina-
tion problem in multi-item E-procurement with variable quantities, The
26th Chinese Control and Decision Conference (2014 CCDC), Changsha,
2014, pp. 5364-5367.
[10] Rituraj and A. K. Jagannatham, Optimal cluster head selection
schemes for hierarchical OFDMA based video sensor networks,” Wire-
less and Mobile Networking Conference (WMNC), 2013 6th Joint IFIP,
Dubai, 2013, pp. 1-6.
[11] J. Zhao, X. Chu, H. Liu, Y. W. Leung and Z. Li, Online procurement
auctions for resource pooling in client-assisted cloud storage systems,
IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM), 2015, pp.
576-584.
45
[12] R. Zhou, Z. Li and C. Wu, An online procurement auction for power
demand response in storage-assisted smart grids, IEEE Conference on
Computer Communications, INFOCOM, 2015, pp. 2641-2649.
[13] H. Houba, D. Laan, D. Veldhuizen, Endogenous entry in lowest-unique
sealed-bid auctions,Theory and Decision, 71, 2, 2011, pp. 269-295
[14] Stefan De Wachter and T. Norman, The predictive power of Nash equi-
librium in difficult games: an empirical analysis of minbid games, De-
partment of Economics at the University of Bergen, 2006
[15] Rapoport, Amnon and Otsubo, Hironori and Kim, Bora and Stein,
William E.: Unique bid auctions: Equilibrium solutions and experimen-
tal evidence, MPRA Paper 4185, University Library of Munich, Ger-
many, Jul 2007.
[16] J.Eichberger and D. Vinogradov, Least Unmatched Price Auctions : A
First Approach, Discussion Paper Series 471, 2008
[17] J. Eichberger, Dmitri Vinogradov: Lowest-Unmatched Price Auctions,
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2015, Vol. 43, pp. 1-17
[18] J. Eichberger, Dmitri Vinogradov: Efficiency of Lowest-Unmatched
Price Auctions, Economics Letters, 2016, Vol. 141, pp. 98?102
[19] Erik Mohlin, Robert Ostling, Joseph Tao-yi Wang, Lowest unique bid
auctions with population uncertainty, Economics Letters, Vol. 134, Sept.
2015, Pages 53-57.
[20] Huang, G.Q., Xu, S.X., 2013. Truthful multi-unit transportation pro-
curement auctions for logistics e-marketplaces. Transport. Res. Part B:
Methodol. 47, 127-148.
[21] Dong-Her Shih, David C. Yen, Chih-Hung Cheng, Ming-Hung Shih, A
secure multi-item e-auction mechanism with bid privacy, Computers and
Security 30 (2011) 273-287
[22] Tembine H.: Distributed strategic learning for wireless engineers, Mas-
ter Course, CRC Press, Taylor & Francis, 2012.
[23] Harsanyi, J. 1973. Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new ra-
tionale for mixed strategy equilibrium points. Internat. J. Game Theory
2, 1-23.
46
[24] Weibull, J., Evolutionary game theory, MIT Press, 1995.
[25] Xin Luo, Hamidou Tembine: Evolutionary coalitional games for ran-
dom access control, Annals of Operations Research, p1-34, 2016, DOI:
10.1007/s10479-016-2198-0
Author Information
Yida Xu received the B.Sc. degree in Electronic Information Engineer-
ing from Chongqing University and the M.S. degree in Information and
Communication Engineering from Zhejiang University in China. He is a
NYUAD Global Network Ph.D. candidate in the department of Electrical
and Computer Engineering at New York University Tandon School of En-
gineering. His research interests include auction theory, game theory and
machine learning.
Hamidou Tembine (S’06-M’10-SM’13) received the M.S. degree in Ap-
plied Mathematics from Ecole Polytechnique in 2006 and the Ph.D. degree
in Computer Science from University of Avignon in 2009. His current re-
search interests include evolutionary games, mean field stochastic games and
applications. In December 2014, Tembine received the IEEE ComSoc Out-
standing Young Researcher Award for his promising research activities for
the benefit of the society. He was the recipient of 7 best article awards in the
applications of game theory. Tembine is a prolific researcher and holds 150
scientific publications including magazines, letters, journals and conferences.
He is author of the book on ”distributed strategic learning for engineers”
(published by CRC Press, Taylor & Francis 2012), and co-author of the
book ”Game Theory and Learning in Wireless Networks” (Elsevier Aca-
demic Press). Tembine has been co-organizer of several scientific meetings
on game theory in networking, wireless communications and smart energy
systems. He is a senior member of IEEE.
47
